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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 78-2a-3 (2) (h) and (j), Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Mr. Mitchell, the defendant/appellee, upon a finding that, as a matter of law, the 
undisputed material facts, and that the case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), was controlling, he was entitled to an order 
dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition to modify the parties' decree of divorce. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court need not defer to the 
trial court's ruling, but only inquire into whether the trial court erred in applying 
the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that that there were 
no disputed issues of material fact. Ron Shepherd Ins., v. Shields, 883 P.2d 650, 
654 (Utah 1994). 
The issue was preserved in the trial court by Mrs. Foulger's objection to 
the Domestic Relation Commissioner's recommendation. (R. at pp. 111-13) 
2. Whether Mr. Mitchell should be awarded his costs and attorney fees 
incurred in defending against Mrs. Foulger's claims, including this appeal. Mr. 
Mitchell submits that there is no legal or factual basis for Mrs. Foulger's appeal. 
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A trial court's decision to deny fees is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Jorgensen 's v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 11, % 11. The 
trial court's broad discretion in determining fees will be considered against an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. In addition, attorney fees may be awarded in 
a case bringing a frivolous appeal, Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App. 110, \ 14. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Mr. Mitchell's motion for 
summary judgment. (Appellee's Addendum attached hereto.) Attorney fees on 
appeal may be awarded pursuant to the provisions of rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an award of attorney fees if the 
appeal is frivolous. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The Appellee submits that there are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations before the Court whose inlerpretation is 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE O F CASE, COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. On or about January 29th, 2001, Mrs. Foulger filed a Petition to modify 
the Decree of Divorce that dissolved the marriage between her and Mr. Mitchell. 
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This Petition alleges that she is now totally disabled and requested that the court 
modify the original divorce decree to award her an interest in Mr. Mitchell's 
retirement benefits. (R. at pp. 45-50) 
2. Mr. Mitchell filed, on March 13 , 2001, a motion for a summary 
judgment, arguing that the Utah case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d 
121 (Utah App. 1988) was controlling in the instant case; and that, accordingly, 
the petition to modify the divorce decree as requested by Mrs. Foulger should be 
dismissed. (R. at pp. 58-59; Appellee's Addendum, attached hereto.) 
3. The motion for summary judgment was argued before Commissioner 
tin 
Thomas N. Amett on April 26 , 2001. Thereafter, the Commissioner 
recommended that Mr. Mitchell's motion be granted. (R. at pp. 110, 134-35) 
4. Mrs. Foulger objected to the Commissioner's recommendation. (R. at 
pp.111-13) 
5. On July 17 , the trial court, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck presiding, 
heard argument on Mrs. Foulger's objection, overruled it, and affirmed the entry 
of the summary judgment. The trial court's ruling was entered as an order on 
August 1st, 2001. (R. at pp. 140, 148-49) 
6. This instant appeal was initiated on August 8,2001. (R. at pp. 151-52) 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. These parties were divorced on October 3, 1977. (R. at p. 30) 
2. Pursuant to the original divorce decree, Mrs. Mitchell was awarded the 
marital home, all of the parties' personal property, except one single bed, a 
portable television set, enough linens, bedcoverings and utensils to set up 
housekeeping, one of the vehicles, and Mr. Mitchell's camping equipment and 
guns. Mr. Mitchell was ordered to pay all of the marital debt, other than the 
home mortgages. (R. at pp. 32-34) 
3. At the time the original divorce was litigated, Mr. Mitchell was an 
employee of Kennecott and was enrolled in its retirement benefits program. 
These facts were well known to Mrs. Foulger. (Addendum no. 5)1 
4. The parties' Decree of Divorce was later modified by Order dated 
January 14, 1981. (R. at pp. 43-44) 
5. The Order of modification made pursuant to Mrs. Foulger's required 
an increase in child support and dealt with a life insurance issue. {Id.) 
6. The Petitioner married John Foulger in 1984. (Addendum no. 5) 
7. The Petitioner was later divorced from Mr. Foulger. (Id.) 
1
 As noted by the Appellant, Mr. Mitchell's memorandum in support of his 
motion for a summary judgment, and his supporting affidavit, is not found in the 
record. Mr. Mitchell's supporting memorandum is attached as an addendum to 
this brief. 
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8. Mr. Mitchell is now retired and is receiving retirement benefits from 
Kennecott. (Id.) 
9. All of the parties'children have reached their majority. (Id.) 
10. On or about January 29th, 2001, Mrs. Foulger filed the petition which 
is now before the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce alleged that she was 
now totally disabled and requested that the court modify the original divorce 
decree to award her an interest in Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. (R. at pp. 
45-50) 
11. Counsel for Mr. Mitchell wrote to Mrs. Foulger's counsel, advising 
him that this Court's ruling in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 
(Utah App. 1988), and in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) 
appeared to be controlling in this case. (Exhibit "E" to Appellee's Addendum, 
attached hereto.) 
12. On March 13th, 2001, Mr. Mitchell filed a motion for a summary 
judgment, arguing that Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, was controlling in this case; 
and that, accordingly, the petition to modify the divorce decree as requested by 
Mrs. Foulger should be dismissed. (R. at pp. 58-59 and Appellee's Addendum.) 
13. The motion for summary judgment was argued before Commissioner 
Thomas N. Amett on April 26th, 2001, who recommended that Mr. Mitchell's 
motion be granted. (R. at pp. 110, 134-35) 
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14. On July 17 , 2001, the trial court heard Mrs. Foulger's objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation, overruled it, and affirmed the entry of the 
summary judgment. (R. at pp. 153-54) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly applied the undisputed material facts to Utah law, 
as set forth in the cases of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah 
App. 1988), and Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), and properly 
granted Mr. Mitchell's motion for a summary judgment dismissing Mrs. 
Foulger's petition to modify the parties' decree of divorce. 
The doctrine of res judicata does apply to divorce proceedings despite the 
continuing jurisdiction of Utah's district courts to modify divorce decrees upon 
proof of significant changes in the divorced parties' circumstances. The doctrine 
has been held to specifically apply with regard to claims made against retirement 
benefits in divorce cases heard prior to the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the 
case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
Utah law with regard to Mrs. Foulger's claim that she now be awarded a 
share of Mr. Mitchell's retirement income was clearly defined prior to her filing 
her petition to modify these parties' decree of divorce. She presents no new legal 
argument or factual basis that is unique, or that sets the instant claim apart from 
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similar claims for a distribution of retirement benefits earlier argued by other 
parties to this Court. Mr. Mitchell should be awarded his costs and attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE GRANT OF THE MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS APPROPRIATE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Mrs. Foulger, in this action, is seeking to modify the decree of divorce 
previously entered between herself and Mr. Mitchell to raise a property 
distribution issue that could have been, and should have been, dealt with in the 
original divorce proceeding. After Mrs. Foulger filed her petition, Mr. Mitchell 
moved for a summary judgment, requesting that the petition be dismissed. 
The grant of a summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Boyce ex rel Boyce v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, *f 18, 
982 P.2d 565. Utah case law, applied to the undisputed facts in this case, did 
establish, as a matter of law that Mr. Mitchell was entitled to the grant of a 
summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition. This applicable case law 
is found in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), and 
in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mr. Mitchell argued, and the trial court agreed, that this Court's earlier 
decision in Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, which dealt directly with the very issue 
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presented in the instant case, was controlling and should be applied. Mrs. and 
Mr. Throckmorton, the petitioner and appellant, respectfully, in that case 
appealed the trial court's denial of Mrs. Throckmorton's request to modify the 
Throckmorton's decree of divorce to grant to her one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's 
retirement benefits. 
The fact patterns and circumstances in Throckmorton, Id., and in the 
instant case, are extremely similar. A comparison of the facts in the case now 
before you with the facts in Throckmorton reveal marriages that had lasted many 
years, that the parties' children from both marriages had reached their majority 
at the time of the petitions to modify, that the respondents had both retired, and 
that both of the petitioners; i.e., Mrs. Throckmorton and Mrs. Foulger, were 
suffering medical problems not present at the time of the divorce, that Mrs. 
Foulger was aware of the existence of her husband's retirement plan at the time 
of the divorce, and that the original decrees of divorce were silent with regard to 
the husbands' retirement benefits The only real difference in this case from 
Throckmorton is that Mrs. Throckmorton was also seeking an alimony increase 
(which she did receive), while in the instant case, Mrs. Foulger remarried shortly 
after her divorce from Mr. Mitchell. 
Mrs. Foulger made no effort in the trial court to distinguish Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d 121, from the instant case. In her brief on appeal she argues for the first 
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time that Throckmorton is "clearly factually different." Mrs. Foulger argues that 
her petition for a modification is based upon two alternative legal theories; which 
are (1) that the asset was never addressed in the original proceeding, and (2) that 
there is the existence of a very significant and life altering changes in her actual 
needs. The problem with this argument is that the cases are not factually 
different, and Mrs. Foulger's is seeking a share of Mr. Mitchell's pension 
benefits. Both of these issues were, in fact, addressed by this Court's ruling in 
Throckmorton. 
The Court dealt squarely with the pension issue in its discussion of the 
effect of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), in which the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized pension benefits as marital assets. Mrs. Throckmorton 
had argued that because at the time of her divorce Utah law did not recognize 
pension benefits as a marital asset that Woodward should be given retroactive 
effect. The Court of Appeals refused to give Woodward retroactive effect 
recognizing the compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property 
settlements. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124. As in Throckmorton, the Mitchell 
divorce was entered prior to the Woodward decision. 
In a more recent case that is also on point, Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 
(Utah App. 1990), this Court looked again at a petition to modify a decree of 
divorce seeking a distribution of the ex-husband's retirement account. The ex-
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wife in Ostler claimed that she was not aware of the retirement benefits at the 
time the divorce was prosecuted. This Court, consistent with the Throckmorton 
decision, affirmed the trial court's decision to not modify the decree of divorce 
to include a distribution of the retirement account. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715. This 
Court also refused once again to make Woodward retroactive, holding that Mrs. 
Ostler's claim of lack of knowledge regarding the retirement benefits did not 
constitute the requisite change of circumstances necessary to modify her decree 
of divorce. Id. Nevertheless, it appears to be Mrs. Foulger's argument that 
despite the Court's clear ruling in Throckmorton and in Ostler that the principles 
of Woodward should be applied. This is clearly not the status of the current case 
law. 
Mrs. Foulger argues that the granting of Mr. Mitchell's motion was 
premature inasmuch as discovery was incomplete or ongoing. However, motions 
for summary judgment may be brought at any time and are not necessarily subject 
to the constraints of case management orders or Ut. R. Civ. P. 26. Mrs. Mitchell 
could have, pursuant to the provisions of Ut. R. Civ. P. 56 (f), sought a 
continuance to take additional discovery, but chose to do so. Such discovery was 
unnecessary in any event. Even assuming that Mrs. Foulger's physical infirmities 
are present, such does not alter the effect of the law as applied to the instant 
undisputed facts 
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The affidavits and pleadings that were before the trial court were sufficient 
to establish that no genuine issues of material fact existed which would preclude 
the granting of Mr. Mitchell's motion as a matter of law. 
Both the lower court's domestic relations commissioner, Commissioner 
Thomas Arnett, Jr., and the trial court judge, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, 
recognized that Throckmorton and Ostler were controlling in light of the 
undisputed facts and, accordingly, granted Mr. Mitchell's motion for the grant of 
a summary judgment. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE 
The state of the law in Utah in 1977, when the Mitchell's Decree of 
Divorce was granted, did not require the specific division of retirement benefits 
as a separate category of marital property. It wasn't until 1982 that the Utah 
Supreme Court first recognized pension benefits as a marital asset. Woodward 
v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). However, as discussed above 
Woodward was not given retroactive effect. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124; 
Ostler, 789P.2dat715. 
This Court did note, of course, how the application of the doctrine of res 
judicata is unique in divorce actions because of that equitable doctrine which 
allows courts to reopen the case on a demonstration that there is a substantial 
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change of circumstances. On this point this Court in Throckmorton made 
reference to Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985), in which it was 
held that in order to modify a prior property award the moving party must 
establish a substantial change of circumstances which was not within the original 
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the original decree was 
rendered. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed in Throckmorton the trial 
court's ruling denying Mrs. Throckmorton an interest in Mr. Throckmorton's 
retirement benefits as there had been a fair opportunity to have the issue 
determined in the original proceeding." 
This Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the doctrine of 
res judicata applies to divorce proceedings. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d at 123. In 
so holding, this Court quoted from Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 
1985), "When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those 
issues which were determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair 
opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." 
As in Throckmorton, the issue of Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefit plan 
was well within these parties' contemplation at the time the original divorce was 
2
 This Court noted that allowing Mr. Throckmorton to keep his retirement 
benefits considering the totality of the original property distribution did not 
offend the Court's sense of justice as Mr. Throckmorton, under the original 
decree was ordered to pay $12,000 in marital debts while Mrs. Throckmorton was 
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litigated. Mrs. Foulger cannot establish the requisite substantial change of 
circumstances. 
Utah Code Annotated may provide for modifications based upon 
substantial material changes in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce, but this is clearly not without limits. In this case Mr. Mitchell's 
retirement benefits were well within the contemplation of the parties'. Mrs. 
Foulger could have dealt with the issue at the time of the original litigation. 
The issues raised in the modification petition are res judicata. This is 
clearly established by case law. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 123. 
III. MR. MITCHELL SHOULD BE AWARDED 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Mr. Mitchell is entitled to an award of his costs and a reasonable attorney's 
fee. Prior to her filing the instant Petition, Mr. Mitchell's attorney was contacted 
by Mrs. Foulger's attorney requesting information on any specific law or facts 
that would suggest that Mrs. Foulger would not now be entitled to a division of 
Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. In response, Mr. Mitchell's attorney wrote 
back to Mrs. Foulger's attorney. In this correspondence specific reference was 
made to both the Throckmorton and Ostler cases. Cites to both cases were 
provided. In light of this, Mrs. Foulger had adequate opportunity to consider the 
awarded the family home and ultimately received $24,000 in equity in that home. 
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propriety of proceeding with her Petition. Despite the clear similarity of the fact 
patterns presented and the case law being on point, she nevertheless proceeded 
with the her petition to modify the divorce decree. 
Mr. Mitchell requested that the trial court award him his costs and attorney 
fees incurred in defending against Mrs. Foulger's claims. The Commissioner 
declined to make this award. Believing that the matter was resolved based upon 
the clear status of the case law, he did not pursue this claim. However, it is now 
appropriate, based upon the instant appeal, that he be awarded his costs and a 
reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to the provisions of rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an award of attorney fees if the 
appeal is frivolous. A frivolous appeal has application in cases with no 
"reasonable legal or factual basis". Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App. 110, f 14, see 
also, Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). Mr. Mitchell 
submits that there is no legal or factual basis for Mrs. Foulger's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact and that Mr. Mitchell was entitled to a summary judgment 
dismissing Mrs. Foulger's petition for modification as a matter of law. This 
Appellee respectfully requests that following its review of the trial court's grant 
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of summary judgment for correctness, e\en gi\ ing no particular deference to its 
conclusions of law, that this Court find that the trial court did not err in appK ing 
the governing law to the undisputed issues of material fact and that it affirm the 
grant of summary judgment. 
Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court grant him his costs and 
attorney fees, or, in the alternative, remand the case to the District Court directing 
it to make the award. 
DATED this < ) / 5 i day of January, 2002. 
Douglas T. Hall 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellee's Brief was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this g | 5 ^ day of 
January, 2002, to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379 
lJ\cn£r^etf 
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DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305) 
Attorney for Respondent 
4885 South. 900 East. Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793 
Telephone 801-259-5000 
Facsimile 801-263-1426 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH LEILA MITCHELL, aka RUTH 
FOULGER, ; 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD R. MITCHELL, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
| MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
| AND AUTHORITIES IN 
| SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
| A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Case No. D-26438 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
COMES NOW the Respondent, by and through counsel, pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, and submits the following 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his motion for a Summary Judgment in 
his favor dismissing the Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, and for an award of a 
reasonable attorney's fee and his costs incurred herein. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. These parties were divorced on October 3, 1977. A copy of the Decree of Divorce 
(the ^Decree") is attached hereto as Exhibit UA", and by reference is incorporated herein. 
2. At the time the original divorce was litigated, Mr. Mitchell was an employee of 
Kennecott and was enrolled in its retirement benefits program. These facts were well known 
- 1 . 
to Mrs. Folger. Affidavit of Donald R. Mitchell, paragraph 4, Mr. Mitchell*s affidavit is 
attached hereto as Exhibit WTT and by reference incorporated herein. 
3. The Decree was later modified by Order dated January 14, 1981. A copy of the 
Order modifying the Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit "C\ and by reference is 
incorporated herein. 
4. The Order of modification required an increase in child support and dealt with life 
insurance issues. Id. 
5. The Petitioner married John Folger in 1984. Mitchell affidavit at paragraph 5. 
6. The Petitioner is since divorced from her husband. Id. at paragraph 6. 
7. Mr. Mitchell is now retired and is receiving retirement benefits from Kennecott. 
Id. at paragraph 7. 
8. All of the parties' children have reached their majority. Id. at paragraph 8. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The grant of a summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Boyce ex rel. Boyce v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, t 18, 982 P.2d 565. 
The undisputed material facts show that the petitioner, Mrs. Folger, is now seeking to 
modify the Decree of Divorce to raise a property distribution issue that could have been, and 
should have been, dealt with in the original divorce proceeding. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has earlier dealt directly with the very issue presented in 
the instant case. In Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), the 
petitioner in that case, Mrs. Throckmorton, appealed the trial court's denial of her request to 
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modify the Throckmorton's decree of divorce to grant to her one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's 
retirement benefits. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the 
doctrine of res judicata applies to divorce proceedings. Id. at p. 123. (A copy of 
Throckmorton is at Exhibit *TT.) In so holding, the Court of Appeals quoted from Jacobsen 
v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985), "When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res 
judicata as to those issues which were determined, or upon all issues which the party had a 
fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." 
The factual circumstances in Throckmorton and in the instant case are very similar. A 
comparison of the facts in the instant case with the facts in Throckmorton reveal marriages 
that had lasted many years, that the parties' children from both marriages had reached their 
majority at the time of the petitions to modify, that the respondents had both retired, and that 
both of the petitioners were suffering medical problems. And, as in Throckmorton, Mrs. 
Folger knew of Mr. Mitchell's retirement program with Kennecott. The only real difference 
in the case is that Mrs. Throckmorton was also seeking an alimony increase (which she did 
receive), while in the instant case, Mrs. Folger remarried shortly after her divorce from Mr. 
Mitchell. 
The Court of Appeals did note how the application of the doctrine of res judicata is 
unique in divorce actions because of that equitable doctrine which allows courts to reopen the 
case on a demonstration that there is a substantial change of circumstances. On this point, the 
Appellate Court made reference to Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985), in 
which it was held that in order to modify a prior property award the moving party must 
establish a substantial change of circumstances which was not within the original 
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the original decree was rendered. 
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Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling denying Mrs. Throckmorton 
an interest in Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits as there had been a fair opportunity to 
have the issue determined in the original proceeding. As in Throckmorton, the issue of Mr. 
Mitchell's retirement benefit plan was well within these parties' contemplation at the time the 
original divorce was litigated. Mrs. Folger cannot establish the requisite substantial change 
of circumstances. 
The Court of Appeals also discussed the effect of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 
431 (Utah 1982), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized pension benefits as marital 
assets. Mrs. Throckmorton had argued that because at the time of her divorce Utah law did 
not recognize pension benefits as a marital asset, Woodward should be given retroactive 
effect. The Court of Appeals refused to give Woodward retroactive effect recognizing the 
compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property settlements. Throckmorton at p. 
124. The instant divorce was entered prior to the Woodward decision. 
In a more recent case, Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), the Court of 
Appeals looked again at a petition to modify a decree of divorce seeking a distribution of the 
ex-husband's retirement account. The ex-wife in Osterler claimed that she was not aware of 
the retirement benefits at the time the divorce was prosecuted. The Court of Appeals, 
consistent with the Throckmorton decision, affirmed the trial court's decision to not modify 
the decree of divorce to include a distribution of the retirement account. 
The Court of Appeals in Ostler referenced the Throckmorton case. It again refused to 
make Woodward retroactive and held that Mrs. Ostler's claim of lack of knowledge regarding 
the retirement benefits did not constitute the requisite change of circumstances necessary to 
modify her decree of divorce. Ostler, supra. 
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II 
Mr. Mitchell is entitled to an award of his costs and a reasonable attorneys fee. Prior 
to her filing the instant Petition, Mr. Mitchell's attorney was contacted by Mrs. Foiger's 
attorney requesting information on any specific law or facts that would suggest that Mrs. 
Foiger would not now be entitled to a division of Mr. Mitchell's retirement benefits. In 
response, Mr. Mitchell's attorney wrote back to Mrs. Foiger's attorney making reference to 
both Throckmorton and Ostler and providing the cites to both cases. A copy of Mr. Hall's 
letter to Mr. Jackson is attached at Exhibit UE" and by reference is incorporated herein. In 
light of this, Mrs. Foiger had adequate opportunity to consider the propriety of proceeding 
with the Petition. Despite the clear similarity of facts presented and the case law being on 
point, she nevertheless proceeded with the instant Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Foiger had the opportunity to litigate the issue of Mr. Mitchell's retirement 
benefits at the time of the divorce. Since she failed to do so, her claim is barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata. In addition, case law, lends full support to this conclusion. Mr. 
Mitchell prays this Court to grant the instant motion for a summary judgment to dismiss Mrs. 
Foiger's petition to modify the decree of divorce to grant her an interest in his retirement 
benefits and to award him his cost incurred herein along with a reasonable attorney's fee. 
DATED this / g # day of March, 2001. 
Douglas T. Hall 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed. 
first class postage pre-paid, this 
tan day of March. 2001. to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111-2379 
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DOUGLAS T. HALL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Facsimile In Utah County 
801-263-1426 801-756-7831 
4885 South, 900 East, Suite 208, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793 
Telephone 801-259-5000 
January 23, 2001 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Mitchell (Folger) v. Mitchell 
Dear Mr. Jackson: 
I do not believe that your client is entitled to a portion of Mr. Mitchell's 
retirement benefits. Not only did Mrs. Folger remarry shortly after her divorce 
from Mr. Mitchell, but there was adequate opportunity to raise the issue of a 
distribution of retirement benefits at the time the original decree of divorce was 
being heard. I invite your attention to Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P,2d 
121 (Utah App. 1988), and the more recent case of Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 
(Utah App. 1990). I believe that the "policy interest favoring the finality of 
property settlements^, Oster, supra, is applicable in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
iA 
Douglas T. Hall 
DTH/jr 
cc: Don Mitchell 
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